

Bildungsroman.

However, what is interesting is that there is a remarkable difference in the patterns of Japanese intellectuals and Chinese intellectuals. Japanese intellectuals are more at ease depending on foreign authorities, while Chinese intellectuals tend to be Sino-centric. That difference in attitude made the Japanese more receptive to Western civilization in the mid-nineteenth century. Psychological tendencies built into nation's psyche can sometimes play an important role at a turning point of history.

I am wondering if some of you attended the lecture by Dr. Doi about "Ambivalence and the psychology of dependence called 'amae' " given here three years ago. That psychology of dependence worked remarkably well when Japan, as a student-country, learnt something from teacher-countries. However, an economic power like Japan cannot eternally remain in the passive position of a receptive student. How to mature is the problem of a student after graduation. It is not possible for Japan to return to its childhood to enjoy peace within its own walls. Japan is obliged to open the country again in this age of global society. Rich countries like Switzerland and Japan could easily become targets of international jealousy, if we do not play roles appropriate to our status as members of the world community. We should forestall such attacks and try to make some positive contribution to world peace. Japan is militarily dependent on U. S. and that has exacerbated the Japanese tendency to be passively dependent in its relations with outside world. Instead of indefinitely staying in that introvert stage of one-sided dependency, what the Japanese now must learn is how to build up effective networks of interdependence and equal partnership.¹

¹ This paper was given at Universität Zürich, April 7, 1999 as the opening lecture in the series "Interdisziplinäre Ringvorlesung Ostasien, Thema: Kulturkontakt."

volumes in 1996. This resurrection seems to reflect the psychological state of some Chinese intellectuals these days. Twenty years have passed since the reopening of China under the strong initiative of Dèng Xiaopíng. At first the Chinese were dazzled, finding that the capitalistic society of the outside world was flourishing, contrary to what they had been taught. Fortunately, every year, the living standard in China has risen, and the Chinese nowadays are beginning to regain confidence in their future. A book entitled *China that can say no* has sold well. They don't want to be dictated to by outsiders. They would like to be self-assertive. In this psychological context, persons like Ku Hung-Ming, who argued in foreign languages in defense of Chinese culture, are favorably remembered as patriots.

To have a longing for a foreign country and for its advanced culture is a common phenomenon. Many students wish to study abroad. And it is natural that when they return home, they are happy to be back in their own culture. It also happens that some people harbor mixed feelings about the object of their longing. For example, Gottfried Keller was not satisfied to stay for ever in Zurich and in 1840 he went to study in Munich. However, according to his French biographer Baldensperger, Keller had ambivalent feelings towards Munich. To quote Baldensperger: "Plus tard, quand la Terre promise se fut transformée pour Keller en une lande stérile, il eut un jour dans un accès de rancune rétrospective, des paroles de colère contre la capitale bavaroise." Keller spoke ill of the capital of Bavaria, using words which I dare not quote.

Some people would say, after having seen these examples, that to long for a far away country when one is young and then to come back to one's own native country to mature is a general process of human formation. It is indeed a course generally followed by the heroes of

defend the traditional ways of the Chinese. His defensiveness probably came from his having been too much exposed to all sorts of contempt from Europeans, as he was obliged to negotiate with high-handed foreigners as Governor Zhang's interpreter. That experience must have had something to do with his excessive self-esteem as a Chinese scholar. He defended Old China, and wrote, among other works *Spirit of the Chinese People* (1915) which was translated into many languages.

When after the Xinhài Revolution of 1911 Ku came to Peking University to chair the department of English, he was not at all sympathetic towards the young Chinese students enthusiastic for reforms. Ku definitely became a reactionary. He did not cut his pig-tail hair. His old hair style became his trademark. He swore loyalty towards the demolished Manchu dynasty, and criticized republicanism and things Western in general; students called him "crazy" and he became very unpopular among the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals. He then came to Japan in 1924 as a guest scholar and gave a series of lectures in English which were welcomed by Japanese conservative intellectuals, faithful to Confucian traditions. Ku insisted that the essence of Eastern culture was now preserved better in Japan than in China, as the Confucian cardinal virtues of loyalty to the sovereign and filial piety to parents were better respected in the monarchical Japan. Japanese Confucianists were very pleased.

After the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the communist take-over of mainland China in 1949, Ku Hung-Ming's name was forgotten. However, to my great surprise, Ku has recently been rehabilitated. April 1998 Peking University celebrated its centenary, and Ku Hung-Ming was counted among the famous professors of the past. His selected writings were translated from English into Chinese and were published in two

that I use a triangulation approach. In the coming century a person with only two compasses will not be competent enough to make a balanced judgment. That means two legs, even though soundly grounded in Japan and in the West, are not enough to open up a three-dimensional perspective. Although my knowledge of China is somewhat limited, I want to consider the case of one Chinese intellectual who travelled to the West and then returned home.

The person in question was the first Chinese Professor of English at the University of Peking, called Ku Hung-Ming (or according to the pinyin system Gu Hōngmíng, 1854-1928); his pen-name is Dongxi Nánbei, which means East-West-South-North. His career is most curious. He was born in the South, on the Malaysian island of Penang as an overseas Chinese of Fújiàn ancestry. He went to the West at the age of twelve, together with a Scottish missionary returning home. He studied in Edinburgh and other European countries until the age of twenty-three, mastering many languages. He married a Japanese woman called Yoshida Sadako, and served for two decades under the Chinese reformer Zhang Zhidōng, Governor of Húnan Province, who propagated the idea of zhongtǐxiyōng, “Chinese Ethics and Application of Western Learning.” Ku later resided in the North, in Beijing, as the first Chinese professor of English at Peking University after the Revolution of 1911. You understand why he called himself East-West-South-North.

He obtained a knowledge of Western civilization matched by few Chinese of his generation. However, his return to native traditions was more than remarkable. He used his knowledge of English not for the Westernization of China but for the propagation abroad of Chinese civilization: Ku translated the *Analects* and other works of Confucius into English and most of his works were written in English. He tried hard to

to grasp the historic organic relationship between the nation and the individual. One of his contemporaries, the journalist Kuga Katsunan expressed similar views; Kuga argued that a Japanese acted not as a member of a bloodless humanity governed by universal values; he acted rather as a member of his own vibrant people, inspired by Japan's own national spirit.

The problem with Amenomori's "preservation of the national essence" movement, however, was that it was used by reactionaries who made a xenophobic defense of traditional culture. If there is a prevailing adulation of Western civilization on the one hand, that kind of reaction seems to be inevitable. Some Japanese do not like cultural subservience to Western intellectual fashions.

The Westernization movement on the one hand, and the "Return to Japan" movement on the other, —which way should we go? This fundamental issue is not yet fully resolved even today. Mori Ōgai (1862–1922), the greatest cultural leader in turn-of-the-century Japan, wrote about his own psychological state when he returned home from four years' study in Germany. He knew that the metaphysical aspects and the physical aspects of a civilization are not always separable. Mori Ōgai, therefore, did not advocate the slogan, "Japanese Spirit, Western Learning" which was used by narrow-minded nationalistic reactionaries as their defensive pretext. Instead, Mori Ōgai preferred to state what sort of a man would be needed in the twentieth century. According to Mori Ōgai, the ideal man for the future of Japan would have two legs, one soundly grounded in his own culture and the other in Western culture, and he would be neither slavishly enamored of the West nor anxious to reject its value and importance.

Let me offer one final example. Professor Holenstein recommended

idea, it left no room for a Japanese identity.

What about the cultural politics of “Japanese Spirit, Western Learning,” which some conservatives proclaimed to be the guideline of the Japanese nation from the time of Sakuma Shōzan in the 1850s? The problem now was that the young generation, imbued with knowledge coming from the West, did not embrace traditional values in their entirety. The model for Hearn’s story, whom I have succeeded in identifying as Amenomori Nobushige, insisted on the preservation of national essence 国粹保存. He, however, did not try to defend Confucian ethics in terms of their universal validity or to legitimize Confucianism in terms of the new rationalist thought. In short, he did not have a nostalgia for the idealized mythological past of China or of Japan. He did not long for an archaic Confucian or Shinto utopia. Instead, he gave traditional values a nationalist justification. On his return home, that is in the early 1890s, Amenomori argued that the preservation of traditional morals and customs was psychologically necessary to the nation because they provided the binding, integrative basis on which Japan’s cultural identity and nationalism could be built. Amenomori and the group Meiji-kai, for which he worked as editor-in-chief of the monthly journal, sought piecemeal change and argued for selective borrowing from the West to improve Japanese society. He adopted the historicist and holist arguments characteristic of conservative theorists in Europe. Interestingly, Amenomori translated for the Meiji-kai journal the Swiss jurist and political scientist Johann Kaspar Bluntschili’s *Allgemeines Staatsrecht* in 1890–91. Probably under Bluntschili’s influence, Amenomori and his group attacked Japanese Westernizers of the civilization and enlightenment movement. According to Amenomori, those who believed in the universal values of Western civilization failed

him to value the strength found in his country's honorable poverty. He would do his utmost to preserve and protect the best in Japan's traditions.

What was of value and beauty in Japanese civilization—things that could be comprehended and appreciated only after coming into contact with foreign culture—now seemed clear to him. Thus, he had become a man longing to return home, and on the day that he set out for Yokohama, he did so not as a blind xenophobe but as “a conservative” who was returning to Japan.

What do you think about this return to Japan? Is it simply a reaction to his earlier enthusiasm? According to the comment written casually by William Griffis, who had taught our protagonist at the castle town of Fukui in 1871, he “visited Europe and came home more intensely Japanese than ever. (He) quaffed Occidental civilization and rejected it.” I don't believe, however, that our protagonist's rejection of Occidental civilization was that total.

For Westerners like the missionary - teacher Griffis, the Westernization movement in Asian nations was unquestionably good. The more Westernized, the better. Many Westerners and quite a few Japanese insisted in the 1870s and 80s that Japan should Westernize wholeheartedly. There was a man named Mori Arinori, who argued that the Japanese should adopt English as their national language, wishing to make a clean break with Japan's feudal past and to make Japan a wholly Western, liberal, democratic, industrial society. By the way, the same man Mori later became the Japanese minister of education, however, by that time he had already made a return to nationalism. You can see how unrealistic and even comical the idea of total Westernization is. The Japanese Westernizers' motto, “Western Spirit, Western Learning” could not be accepted, since, apart from the inherent impracticability of the

was his conviction that he became a Christian against his parents' opposition. To discard the faith of his ancestors was cause for more than a moment's distress: He was disowned by his family, scorned by his friends, deprived of all the benefits accompanying his noble status, and reduced to destitution. Still, the samurai discipline of his youth enabled him to persevere with fortitude despite all the hardships to which he fell victim. As a true patriot and seeker of the truth, he ascertained where his convictions lay and pursued these without fear or regret.

However, Hearn's protagonist was soon disturbed to discover that the knowledge derived from modern science, which had enabled his missionary-teachers to demonstrate the absurdity of Japan's ancient beliefs, could also be used to demonstrate absurdities in the Christian faith. The Western missionaries were often surprised and shocked to discover that the more intelligent their Japanese students were, the sooner they tended to leave the church. So it was with this youth, who became an agnostic in religious matters and a liberal in political affairs.

Forced to leave Japan, he went to Korea and then to China, where he earned his living as a teacher for a time before making his way to Europe. There he lived for many years, observing and obtaining a knowledge of Western civilization matched by few Japanese. He lived in many European cities and engaged in various types of work. The West appeared to him a land of giants, far greater than he had ever imagined. On both the material and the intellectual fronts, Hearn's hero gained two articles of faith. Japan was being forced by necessity to learn Western science and to adopt much from the material culture of its enemies; nevertheless there was no compelling reason to discard completely the concepts of duty and honor and ideas of right and wrong that had been inherited from the past. The prodigality inherent in Western life taught

wurden.

Then comes Hofmannsthal's extremely high evaluation of the story:

Und daneben das Kapitel "Ein Konservativer". Das ist keineswegs eine Novelle: das ist eine Einsicht, eine politische Einsicht, zusammengedrängt wie ein Kunstwerk, vorgetragen wie eine Anekdote: ich denke, es ist kurzweilig ein Produkt des Journalismus, des höchstkultivierten, des fruchtbarsten und ernsthaftesten, den es geben kann.

Now let me summarize the story of the Japanese conservative, who was in many regards representative.

Hearn's protagonist was a high-ranking samurai born towards 1858 and raised in a castle town. Trained in the martial arts and schooled in Confucian and other traditional values, he was disciplined to honor the spirits of his forebears and to scorn death. This warrior witnessed the coming of the American Black Ships; soon "barbarians" were employed as teachers of military science within his castle town, as that was the policy of "Japanese Spirit, Western Learning". After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the protagonist left home to learn English in the open port city of Yokohama under a foreign missionary. At first he believed that love of country required him to learn about enemy conditions in a detached, cool manner, in keeping with the dictum "Know the enemy". But before long he was deeply impressed by the overwhelming superiority of Western civilization and decided that because the basis of its power lay in Christianity, he was duty bound as a Japanese patriot to accept this higher religion and encourage all his countrymen to convert. So intense

bitter nationalism, accompanied by a strong dislike of the West which had nourished their youthful ardours. Not long ago an able and brilliant member of this class observed to the writer that most of his contemporaries, products of Western education, had turned against the Western democracies feeling that their liberalism was a sham. (G. B. Sansom: *The Western World and Japan*, Cresset, p 442)

You see the importance of the problem. In fact, Sansom is referring to the attitude of Japanese intellectuals during WWII.

(In 1988 and 89, Volumes 6 and 5 of *the Cambridge History of Japan* were published, and Professors Najita and Harootunian deal with the problem in Volume 6 and Professor Pyle in Volume 5. However, there are so many factual mistakes especially in Volume 6, I have some misgivings about the validity of their stereotyped interpretations.)

To describe the typical experience of a Japanese intellectual of this period, I'll borrow from the writer Lafcadio Hearn an account of a pilgrimage to the idealized West and the return home. The story is entitled "A Conservative," which is included in Hearn's third book on Japan *Kokoro*, published in 1896. Perhaps you have not heard of Lafcadio Hearn or of this story. Fortunately, it comes very highly recommended by no less an authority than Hugo von Hofmannsthal. On hearing of the death of Hearn in 1904, the eminent literary critic wrote an essay in which he clarifies the meaning of the title, *Kokoro*:

... und das liebe Buch *Kokoro*, vielleicht das schönste von allen. Die Blätter, aus denen sich dieser Band zusammensetzt, handeln mehr von dem inneren als dem äusseren Leben Japans—dies ist der Grund, weshalb sie unter dem Titel "Kokoro" ("Herz") verbunden

Ueda Bin's translation appeared in 1903, and this poem by a little known German Volksdichter became immensely popular among the Japanese. Why? Apart from the artistic reason that the poem was most skillfully translated, there is another factor. Psychoanalytically speaking, there is a strong element of *Sehnsucht*, or longing for a far away paradise beyond the mountains. The translation made a strong appeal to a traditional Japanese sentiment, because in form as well as in content the Japanese translation (known as "Yama no anata no sora tōku") is a modern variation of earlier Japanese poems in praise of the Buddhist Western Paradise. The unapproachable distant paradise now seemed to exist somewhere in Western Europe. The more inaccessible the new paradise was, the more attractive it seemed to young Japanese after the opening of the country. There was, therefore, a certain continuity in the Japanese longing for the West far away beyond the sea.

Now let us examine Japanese intellectuals' longing for the West, that is Europe and America, and their subsequent return to the mother country. The phenomenon of the Westernized intellectual returning to native traditions is by no means restricted to Japan but is also found in thinkers and leaders in Russia, in South-east Asian countries and also in Islamic countries. This is therefore a very important problem. About the relationship between the Western world and Japan, the best book ever written was by Sir George Sansom. In his book published in 1950 the British historian wrote as follows:

An interesting chapter of modern Japanese history could be written by tracing the careers of clever young men educated in liberal surroundings in England or America, who returned to Japan flushed with democratic enthusiasms and in course of time lapsed into a

The first modern Chinese author Lu Xùn, who came to study medical science in Japan after the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, found that the use of classical Chinese was already in decline in the peripheral regions of Asia at the beginning of the 20th century. Like Dante, who had travelled widely in peripheral regions of Southern Europe and had become familiar with their native poetry, Lu Xùn felt that true inner sentiment could only be expressed through one's own vernacular language. When Lu Xùn studied in Japan, Japanese authors like Natsume Sōseki and Mori Ōgai were producing works of literature in vernacular Japanese, although both were capable of composing poems in classical Chinese. Witnessing this literary renaissance in an Asian country, Lu Xùn on his return home became, in 1918, the first modern Chinese author to use *báihuà*, or vernacular Chinese to write works of literature. In short, the modernization of East Asia contained an element of cultural nationalism and return to native tradition as well as the element of Westernization.

This is the general background of the time when Japan turned to the West, looking for an alternative to the cultural model of classical China. That is when Japanese longing for Europe began. Let me insert here a curious example of that longing, *Sehnsucht nach jenseitigem Land*. It is significant that one of the most popular German poems ever translated into Japanese is the following by Carl Busse (1872–1918):

Über den Bergen, weit zu wandern,
Sagen die Leute, wohnt das Glück.
Ach, und ich ging im Schwarme der andern,
Kam mit verweinten Augen zurück.
Über den Bergen, weit, weit drüben,
Sagen die Leute, wohnt das Glück. . .

corresponded to the position occupied by Latin in medieval Europe. Let us make here a macroscopic comparison. How was it possible for you to free yourselves from Latin-dominated culture? As you know, to learn Latin is a good thing; however, to be dominated by Latin at the expense of your mother tongue is another thing. It is the same with classical Chinese. Think of the linguistic situation in Southern Europe in the Middle Ages. Who were the people who began to express their inner feelings in their own vernacular tongue instead of in Latin? Was it not people living in the peripheral regions of the old Roman Empire such as Sicily, Provence, Spain or France who began to write poetry using their own vernacular tongue? And did this change not happen much earlier on the periphery than in the Italian peninsula itself, where the prestige of Latin was most deeply rooted? It was only with the appearance of the genius of Dante that Latin belatedly gave way to vernacular Italian even in Central Italy.

Interestingly, in East Asia too it was in the peripheral regions such as Japan that the vernacular first began to be used in literary works of *monogatari* or romances. Because of the sexual discrimination, court ladies in Japan were not supposed to write in classical Chinese. *The Tale of Genji*, therefore, was written in vernacular Japanese by a court lady at the beginning of the 11th century. At that time Japanese men of education were supposed to write in classical Chinese. The difference between the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire is that while the Western Roman Empire perished as early as 476, the Chinese Empire continued to exist and even to expand. The prestige of classical Chinese was deeply rooted in China's imperial institutions, as it was the official language of the governing class of *literati*, who were selected to be government officials thanks to their mastery of Confucian classics.

“Tōyōdōtoku Seiyōgeijutsu”東洋道德西洋芸術. It means “Eastern Ethics, Western Technology.” Sakuma advocated that slogan in order to introduce the products of Western science. A motto more commonly used by Japanese modernizers was “Wakon Yōsai”和魂洋才, which means “Japanese Spirit, Western Learning.” True or not, it was necessary for the Japanese to insist on their spiritual superiority. Sakuma genuinely believed in Japanese samurai ethics. In China similar eclectic ideas were expressed by reform-minded people, when Qing China was defeated by Japan in 1895. The Chinese also began, belatedly, to feel the need for modernization and coined their slogan “zhongtǐxiyòng”中体西用 which may be translated as “Chinese substance, Western application,” insisting on Chinese spiritual initiative in using Western material techniques. Compared with the rapid and wide-spread acceptance of that eclectic idea in Japan, the Chinese were slow in changing their cultural direction: there was a time lag of more than forty years, which suggests how psychological resistance was deeply rooted in the sino-centric mentality. For the Japanese it was not so difficult to adopt the slogan “Japanese Spirit, Western Learning,” as it was a variation of much older phrase “Japanese Spirit, Chinese Learning.” Indeed, an expression similar to “Japanese Spirit, Chinese Learning” appeared in *the Tale of Genji*, written towards the year 1000.

In short, to cast away classics written in Chinese and to begin to read books written in Western languages was less difficult for the Japanese samurai than for the Chinese literati. Confucian values have something to do with the pride of the Chinese élite and with their own cultural identity. It was easier for the Japanese to get rid of Chinese classics than it was for the Chinese themselves.

The position occupied by classical Chinese in East Asia roughly

Before analyzing the case of East Asia, let me remind you of the attraction of the force of vision. You probably understand how nostalgia moves people in a certain cultural direction. If you have read Burckhardt's *Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, you understand the influence that culture of classical antiquity exercised over Italians of the trecento and quattrocento. Western humanists had a strong longing for the idealized past. Nostalgia or Sehnsucht sometimes serves as a driving force in history. The difference between Chinese intellectuals and Japanese intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century lay precisely in the direction of the nostalgia they experienced. It is true that Chinese intellectuals too had their nostalgia. China was the cradle of a great civilization and had remained its center for several thousand years. During that span of time Chinese civilization was almost self-sufficient. The problem with China was that until its encounter with the West it had no "other" to cope with. It is true that China was conquered by Mongols in 13th century and by Manchus in 17th century. However, in both cases, the conquerors were in the end culturally assimilated by the conquered. If Confucian scholar-officials had nostalgia, it was for their own remote idealized past governed by the legendary sages. Even in the later years of the nineteenth century, the classical culture of ancient China continued to attract Chinese literati. For them, Westerners were red-haired barbarians, bestial beings to be ignored. To the chauvinistic samurai of Japan, Westerners were devils, too. However, as warriors, the Japanese samurai at least recognized the superiority of Western military technology.

Let us compare Japanese and Chinese slogans of modernization. One of the most influential Japanese samurai-ideologues of the mid-nineteenth century was Sakuma Shōzan (1811-1864). When China was defeated by the British in the Opium War, Sakuma coined the phrase

who had occupied the highest position in the Tokugawa Confucian academy, was considered the best Japanese scholar in classical Chinese studies of the time. Nakamura, however, volunteered to study in London. He was very much impressed with the results of the Industrial Revolution that had taken place in England. The Confucian scholar was most favorably impressed by the Protestant work ethic. Nakamura translated Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help* in 1870 on his return home. That was the first English book ever translated into Japanese, and it became a best-seller. One million copies were sold, and the book taught the Japanese how to build an industrial nation comparable to England. Some of you might have heard about Smiles' *Selbst-Hilfe*, as the German translation was in Reclam.

I often wondered why it was possible for the Japanese to turn to the West and to have that Westernization fever as early as in the 1870s and 80s, while other Asian countries were much slower in their modernization efforts. It is understandable that Asian peoples under Western colonization were left behind and became late starters in the race to modernize.

But what about China, that empire once called “a sleeping lion” by Westerners? There are many explanations—political, economic and historical—for the belated awakening of China. The official Marxist interpretations tend to attribute all faults to foreign aggressors and reactionary bureaucrats. However, Chinese young scholars today do not believe any more in such ideological explanations. An interpretation which I would like to attempt here is a psychological one, as that aspect of the problem is often overlooked by materialist historians. I would like to stress some psychological tendencies to explain the ambivalent nature of the problem of nostalgia for the West and return to the East.

Republic of China are coming again in large numbers to Japan. (The number of Chinese students in Japan is second only to the number in the United States.) It is under these circumstances that I have been invited several times to Beijing to teach the modern cultural history of Japan to graduate students selected for Japanese universities. Their attitudes towards Japan are more or less ambivalent. On the one hand, Japan is seen as an imperialistic power that committed acts of aggression against China. On the other hand, Japan is a nation that succeeded in transforming itself from a feudalistic agricultural society into a modern industrial one in a comparatively short span of time, first after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and second after the defeat of 1945. What the Chinese students want to know is: why it was possible for Japan to modernize rapidly, while China lagged behind.

I do not have a definitive answer. However, what I taught there and what I am going to talk about today has something to do with this question. As I have some misgivings about the effectiveness of theoretical approaches to history, either Marxist or Maoist, let us look at concrete facts and examples. When I wrote for *The Cambridge History of Japan* (volume 5, The Nineteenth Century), a chapter entitled "Japan's Turn to the West," I examined two intellectual leaders of Japan's "civilization and enlightenment" movement: Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) and Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891). Fukuzawa's *Autobiography*, which is available in English translation, is extremely interesting. He recommended that the Japanese not read any more Chinese classics; he encouraged them to read books written in English. In Fukuzawa's words, Japanese scholars of Chinese classics were "rice-consuming dictionaries," who were of little practical use in solving the problems of the day. Fukuzawa was a sort of iconoclast, while another scholar, Nakamura,

Yàng-dī, the Emperor of Suí dynasty was not pleased with this letter and said, “This is an impolite letter from the barbarians. Such a letter should not again be brought to our attention.” (This exchange is found in the chapter on East Barbarians in the *Suí History*.)

The subject of my talk today, which is how Japanese and Chinese intellectuals related to the West, has something to do with these self-definitions of the Japanese and of the Chinese concerning their geo-cultural positions in the world.

Let us begin with the case of Japan. Even before the Japanese knew the existence of Europe, they had already experienced desire for the cultural products of a distant western empire—in this case, China. Throughout much of Japan’s history, the inhabitants of that peripheral country, composed of islands scattered along the Asian continent, have selectively borrowed many things from abroad. The first era of assimilating Chinese culture occurred in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries when envoys and students were sent to Táng China. The second peak was around the fourteenth century when ships were sent to Míng China. The third era was from the seventeenth century to the Meiji Restoration of 1868: during that period the official ideology of the governing class in Japan was Confucianism. The Meiji Restoration was, politically speaking, the emergence of Japan as a modern state: Japan opened its doors to the West, and from that time on the West replaced China as the “Other” for the Japanese. The fourth surge in the Sino-Japanese cultural relationship went in the opposite direction, with China sending several thousand students a year to Japan after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, at a time when the decadent Qing dynasty abolished the examination system for the selection of governmental officials. After Máo Zédong’s death, we entered the fifth stage: students from the People’s

East Asian intellectuals: why quite a few of them, even if pro-Western in their youth, become different in their later life.

My first question to you is very simple. Is Japan situated in the East? You will doubtless answer yes and the Japanese agree about this rudimentary geographical fact. Euphemistically speaking, Japan is the country of the Rising Sun, while you Europeans are living in the Abendland, in the Occident. Then how about China? You say China, too, is situated in the East, and the Japanese of course agree that China is a part of the East, which is called in Japanese 東洋 Tōyō and in Chinese 東洋 Dongyāng: although the pronunciations are different, the two characters used are the same. A problem, however, arises from this geographical notion, for most Chinese did not think that China is located in Dongyāng, or in the East. To them Japan is located in the East. In the minds of many Chinese, China was, and subconsciously still is, located in the center of the universe. The Chinese call their country Zhongguó; zhong means center, guó means country. The expressions the Middle Kingdom, das Reich der Mitte or le royaume du milieu precisely derive from the Chinese word Zhongguó. (By the way, the Chinese insist on using these two Chinese characters even to the Japanese, under the pretext that the Japanese term Shina, which originally derives from the Italian Cina, is reminiscent of imperialistic aggression.) That hierarchical notion is deeply rooted in the Chinese past. Towards the end of sixth century, the Japanese Prince Shōtoku sent the following letter to the Emperor of China:

The Son of Heaven in the land where the sun rises addresses a letter to the Son of Heaven in the land where the sun sets. We hope you are in good health.

Nostalgia for the West and Return to the East:

Patterns of Japanese and Chinese Intellectuals—

Sukehiro HIRAKAWA

Some forty-five years ago, I received a scholarship to study in France and Italy. While travelling between Paris and Florence, I often went through Switzerland. I admired the beautiful scenery, but I was never able to stop. To the Japanese, Switzerland was very much idealized in those years following WWII. However, your living standard was already very high in the 1950s, and it was impossible for a poor student from a defeated nation to visit your country. I am sorry I still do not know Swiss people very well, so I do not know what knowledge you have concerning Japan and China.

In other Western countries I have often been mistaken for a Chinese person; perhaps you have experienced something similar. It is indeed difficult for people living in a Far Eastern or Far Western country to distinguish peoples belonging to other races. Those of you who have been to Japan must have been called “Amerika-jin” by Japanese children, for Westerners have generally been identified as Americans by ordinary Japanese citizens since the time of the American occupation of Japan.

Therefore, please allow me to begin by examining your fundamental notions about Japan and China before I go on to discuss some psychological tendencies, which I believe have been decisive in the lives of