

To the Manner Born: Appreciations of Language and Culture

David Mayo

1 Introduction

The present study surveys widely held or debated views concerning the nature of the relationship between language and culture. In the process, several dissimilar and partial appreciations of that relationship are noted; and finally the framing of a new appreciation, one with a special significance for language learners and teachers, is undertaken.

2 Terms and design

2.1 Terms

The term *appreciation* has been adopted in recognition that contemplating a relationship between language and culture may involve only the apprehension of one kind of evidence, or may include the apprehension of several kinds of evidence and one or more layers of theory where linguistics overlaps psychology and philosophy. The term *culture* marks only a starting-point for touring the vicinity of language with attention to the intertwined notions of culture, society, myth, and thought. In the interest of brevity, the reader is asked to endure the introduction of a new set of initials: LCC for the soon-tiresome omnibus term, *language-cum-culture*. This should be understood as a placeholder for the subject of inquiry: the relationship between language and culture.

2.2 Design

Section 3 explores pertinent realms of theory, including a somewhat neglected one. Section 4 reviews the historical evidence of a relationship between language and culture, as seen in patterns of semantic change and lexical creativity, and ends with some notes on the current outlook. Section 5 examines articles in professional journals to identify current appreciations of LCC among language-teaching professionals. Section 6 attempts a synthesis of suggestive elements from the preceding sections, and Section 7 summarizes the study.

3 Theoretical appreciations

3.1 Models of natural-language use

3.1.1 The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

One well-known model of LCC is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, which, if generally accepted, would place us well beyond the questioning stance of the present study, for it asserts that the cultural life of a society is fundamentally determined by its language. Though Sapir continued to state that culture is an aggregation of individual personalities (1949), he increasingly believed that a particular aggregation, acting through its language, tends to determine how individual minds construe the world. Whorf extended this thesis, largely by a comparison of European and indigenous American languages, into a strong theory of linguistic relativity:

Thus our linguistically determined thought world not only collaborates with our cultural idols and ideals, but engages even our unconscious personal reactions in its patterns and gives them certain typical characters.

(Whorf 1956:154)

This strong theory has its weak variants, but to the extent that they are weak, they are insignificant; that is, they hedge the essential determinism that makes Whorfian thought noteworthy. By 1953, when thinkers from various disciplines met in Chicago to reassess the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, it was already under

siege (Hoijer 1954). By 1980, critics could point to enough flaws in its major tenets to conclude that it “is most plausible where it is relatively trivial” (Sampson 1980:94). Carruthers (1996) has proposed a cognitive conception of language that is explicitly free of Whorfian cultural relativism; and in language pedagogy, the consensus is that learners should see the relationship between language and culture as one of interaction rather than causation (Stern 1983). Nevertheless, the Kantian assumptions that underlie Whorfianism remain implicitly at issue in any discussion of LCC. Though they were overextended in the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, they can be found at the bottom of more prudent developments such as Cassirer’s relativist philosophy of language (1946,1955) and Jackendoff’s universalist psychology of language (1983,1992), which will be treated below.

3.1.2 The Metaphor Principle

Lakoff acknowledges a debt to Sapir-Whorf in arriving at his belief that language and the conceptual system underlying it are essentially metaphorical (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff & Kovecses 1987). This belief is epitomized by equations like ANGER IS HEAT, which attempt to account for the association of certain metaphorical patterns with certain notions, as in *hot under the collar*, *boiling mad*, and *simmering with indignation*. It should be noted, however, that Lakoff has worked from a study of American English to a thesis that relates conceptual metaphors to human physiology and not merely to local culture. That implication of universality remains admittedly unsubstantiated by research in the metaphorical patterns of other languages. We are left with a large collection of metaphorical sets that may reveal cultural attitudes toward the concepts expressed, but Lakoff’s folk model does not attempt to demonstrate such connections.

3.1.3 The Idiom Principle

Sinclair, like his mentors Firth and Halliday, approaches language through lexis, which he regards not as a supply of meaningful fillers for grammatical slots, but as meaningful grammar. The nature of the resulting innovation in

grammar and semantics can be seen in the pairing of a statement by a prominent exponent of interpretive semantics with one by Sinclair:

This, in turn, shows that any constituent's meaning is a compositional function of the meanings of its parts and thus, ultimately, its morphemes. Idioms are the exceptions that prove this rule. (Katz 1972:35)

The overwhelming nature of this evidence leads us to elevate the principle of idiom from being a rather minor feature, compared with grammar, to being at least as important as grammar in the explanation of how meaning arises in text. (Sinclair 1987:322)

Sinclair's evidence shows that we do not simply choose words piecemeal, but often choose word combinations and patterns of various kinds, collectively called idioms, that we have encountered before (Sinclair 1987). This means that we speak, write, and comprehend according to the verbal customs of our language community (as contrasted with a mere system of grammatical rules and lexical materials), often regenerating composite meanings that have been generated countless times by other members of the community. It is not the "linguistically determined thought world" of Whorf. In its conception, the Idiom Principle has nothing whatever to do with culture. In its implications, however, it blends with the Metaphor Principle, imparting a subtle texture to the model of a conceptual world whose contours we know, or perhaps continually regenerate, through accustomed language patterns. The importance of idiomatic meaning will be seen again, below.

3.2 The nature of language and thought

3.2.1 Conception and representation

Those who ponder the essential nature of language and thought disagree whether language is integral to thought. Though Carruthers (1996) demurs at arguments that this is conceptually necessary, his main thesis is that conscious thinking is indeed done in sentences of natural language, the language of society. Pinker (1994) emphatically separates thought from natural language; how-

ever, he invokes the notion, advanced by Fodor (1975, 1987), that the mind conceives thoughts in a wordless mental language, *Mentalese*, which we all share, and then expresses them in natural language. The term “languages of the mind” in Jackendoff’s *Conceptual Semantics* is not to be taken in quite the same sense; it is a psychological metaphor that refers to multiple levels of mental representation. Though Jackendoff believes in an innate language facility, he does not suggest that language is the medium of thought, nor does he regard words as having objective meanings (Jackendoff 1983, 1992).

We have maintained unrelentingly that word meanings must be treated as internalized mental representations. This ... rules out a Platonic theory such as Katz’s (1980), where word meanings are abstract objects existing independently of minds. (Jackendoff 1983:109)

Jackendoff then demonstrates the futility of trying to decompose word meanings into reliable conditions for word use (see 1983). This has an unintended significance for the representational world of LCC: by invalidating the notion of discrete word meaning, it underscores the importance of idiomatic meaning, which words gain from patterns of use in the social environment. As for choosing between Kantian and Platonic theories:

It is obvious, and needs no further demonstration, that the inner meaning of both doctrines is wholly the same; that both declare the visible world to be a phenomenon which in itself is void and empty, and which has meaning and borrowed reality only through the thing that expresses itself in it (the thing-in-itself in the one case, the Idea in the other).

(Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*)

Inevitably, then, deep thinking subtracts a dimension from the concept of LCC: the underlying assumption of known meanings which natural language would convey if culture did not influence it. Whichever way the thinkers lead, they all walk on the same water; even, ultimately, Carruthers (1996), whose realism only holds that beliefs and desires really exist in the mind. For non-theorists, this subtraction of substance can be alienating. What is needed, after

all, is a way of locating language in actual human experience. Fortunately, there is an eddy of thought where we may find the theoretical basis for a useful new appreciation of LCC.

3.2.2 Relation and reception

Fynsk (1996) and Fiumara (1990) advocate a revaluation of language as relation (not only signification) and reception (not only expression). This thinking, in which both writers refer to Heidegger, swirls quietly against the long-prevailing current of Western philosophy wherein *logos* is no longer “the word” in all its aspects, but particularly the word of signification and expression, the thrust of language from the mind of the subject (Fiumara 1990). In beginning his interpretation of Heidegger’s *On the Way to Language*, Fynsk writes:

The notion of experience, as we will see, actually adds quite a bit to what we have recognized thus far regarding the relation between language and humankind. ... To undergo an experience with language is to mark and traverse a threshold by way of a receptive joining with a countering address (an address in which there speaks the binding *law* of language, its *Ge-heiss*). (Fynsk 1996:39)

Note that *relation*, for Heidegger and Fynsk, is not merely a way between communicative beings, but first a way between humankind and language, starting from the recognition that language *is*. In Fiumara (1990), there is a heightened emphasis on the receptive aspect of relation. Here we are asked to reconsider “a system of knowledge that tends to ignore listening processes”, a “halved” *logos* lacking the senses *to gather* and *to shelter* that are present in the verb *legein* (Fiumara 1990:1-2). At the heart of Fiumara’s essay is this paradox: No one denies that talking requires listening, and yet we of the West have built our cultural edifice on unlistening talk. Deprived of half our *logos* by a tradition that sets a premium on the last word, we progress to higher levels of persuasive craft while failing to cultivate rationality.

Tannen (1998), in her analysis of America’s “argument culture”, reminds us that there are roads not taken by the assertive Western intellectual tradition:

If Aristotelian philosophy, with its emphasis on formal logic, was based on the assumption that truth is gained by opposition, Chinese philosophy offers an alternative view. With its emphasis on harmony, says anthropologist Linda Young, Chinese philosophy sees a diverse universe in precarious balance that is maintained by talk. This translates into methods of investigation that focus more on integrating ideas and exploring relations among them than on opposing ideas and fighting over them. (Tannen 1998:258)

It is in a similar vein that Fiumara writes, with reference to the Western way of confronting ideas:

A recovery of our *logos* may be facilitated by a retrieval of a more 'circular' way of thinking, as it were, entailing repeated confrontations which may eventually result in the rule of dwelling and coexistence. (Fiumara 1990:16)

Later we shall again pick up the thread of relation and reception, but let us now return from the realm of theory to that of society and see how the verbal representations of natural language tend to change over time.

4 Historical appreciations

4.1 Evidence

As one's cultural environment changes, one must continually choose (consciously or not) whether to change with it or fossilize within it.

She was not contented unless she could go beyond the Saxons; and would certainly have christened her children, had she had children, by the names of the ancient Britons. In some respects she was not unlike Scott's Ulrica, and had she been given to cursing, she would certainly have done so in the names of Mista, Skogula, and Zerneck. Not having submitted to the embraces of any polluting Norman, as poor Ulrica had done, and having assisted no parricide, the milk of human kindness was not curdled in her bosom. She never cursed, therefore, but blessed rather. This, however, she

did in a strange uncouth Saxon manner that would have been unintelligible to any peasants but her own. (Trollope, *Barchester Towers*, “The Thornes of Ullathorne”)

Miss Thorne’s purism only serves to remind us that culture and language are bound to change, apparently in concert. Changing in concert does not mean changing simultaneously or in equal measure, for, as Pinker (1994) notes, we often adapt words to new uses. Strict reasoning from etymology, of the kind that would replace *library* with *media center*, thus amounts to superstition about the embodiment of meaning. Still, people do make new language, and sometimes it is the work of the cursing classes. Pinker hails the arrival of the transitive verb *flake* (an exigency of the computer culture, which lets us convey our thoughts faster than we can judge them), cites the slang origins of many everyday words, and concludes, “Vehicles for expressing thought are being created far more quickly than they are being lost” (Pinker 1994:400). In the same chapter, “The Language Mavens”, he argues that jeremiads about linguistic degeneration betray a misunderstanding of linguistic evolution. Support comes in waves from writers whose respect for language is undoubted (see Barfield 1967; Evans & Evans 1957).

Barfield’s *History in English Words* abounds in examples of change, away from the original uses of words, in a process that may well have seemed lamentable to someone:

Used in ecclesiastical Latin, and later in English, *conscience* seems to have grown more and more real, until at last it became that semi-personified and perfectly private mentor whom we are inclined to mean today when we speak of ‘my *conscience*’ or ‘his *conscience*’. (Barfield 1967:133)

Note our changing capacity to mean. The prevailing idea of conscience changed; the sense and syntax of the word changed; and speakers were enabled, but also tentatively bound, to express the new idea when they used the old word.

4.2 Processes

Lehmann (1973), citing Meillet, describes three general processes of semantic change. A change of linguistic context may affect word meaning, as when *pool* came to collocate frequently with *swimming*. More often, semantic change has resulted from the borrowing of words (*poet*, *oxygen*) or from a change of reference or referent (as with *picture* since the advent of photography). A subset of this last category directly reveals the impingement of culture on verbal expression: semantic change due to taboo. Avoidance of a word frequently causes the abhorred meaning to be transferred to a euphemistic substitute, so that one word may be lost while the other loses its neutrality. The Evanses demonstrate an opposite, socially defiant, kind of impingement that is observed more often than it is called by its name:

If it is plain talk to call a spade a spade and a euphemism to call it a delving instrument, it is a dysphemism to call it a bloody shovel.

(Evans & Evans 1957:162)

On the strength of historical evidence alone, we can not only appreciate but delight in the interplay of language and culture.

4.3 Outlook

In a 1998 interview, David Crystal states, “we are at an absolutely crucial turning point in the history of language”. He is referring to the emergence of English as a global language and the prospect that many other languages will soon become extinct, though not necessarily because English is extinguishing them (Bowers 1998). This forecast implies that individual systems of LCC are becoming highly unstable. It portends not only wholesale linguistic change for many human beings, but also unimagined changes in the English language as the medium of expression for an increasing variety of cultures. If it is right, the future must surely hold a Sisyphean task for the language mavens.

Jackendoff, looking far ahead and deep into the notions of language and culture, suggests with explicit caution that a greater understanding of bio-cultural

universals may give us “the beginning of a principled answer to total cultural relativism” (Jackendoff 1992:81). Universality, and specifically the Universal Grammar theory of language, is a mainstay of Jackendoff’s thinking, as of Pinker’s. In concluding *The Language Instinct*, Pinker reminds us that the very recognition of universal principles can give rise to a sense of language community:

Knowing about the ubiquity of complex language across individuals and cultures and the single mental design underlying them all, no speech seems foreign to me, even when I cannot understand a word. (Pinker 1994:430)

5 Phenomenal appreciations

Phenomenal appreciations of LCC are represented briefly by three articles that appeared in publications for language-teaching professionals. These articles, and others mentioned below in passing, suggested a separate category when it was found that they all displayed a focus on phenomena.

5.1 Investigative LCC

Not only are proverbs a rich linguistic resource of the target language; they also reflect particular aspects of the target culture. (Zapata 1998:38)

Zapata directs our attention to language itself. She first cites several reasons for studying proverbs, from the incidental (they are of manageable length) to the germane (they elicit comparative reflections on culture) and then reports a great variety of activities devised for the individual student to perform by way of investigating a selected proverb. Indeed, the main purpose of this short article evidently is to list activity ideas, but it does represent a view of certain language data as crystals of culture. This is the most straightforward kind of phenomenal appreciation, and the one closest to the historical appreciations. Here, the phenomena are pieces of language. Though apparently straightforward, this appreciation begets controversy since the desire to enrich second-language learning

with proverbs or other culture-specific idioms runs counter to the desire to make English accessible as a medium of communication with a minimum of cultural coloration.

5.2 Communicative LCC

The aim implicit in Meier (1997) is to help students increase their communicative sophistication. The article advocates heightening students' awareness of cultural assumptions as a resource to be drawn upon in intercultural encounters, and specifically argues that the framework for politeness of Brown and Levinson should be replaced with a working definition of politeness as appropriateness. Culture, here, is being considered not as a heritage captured in the amber of language, but as a factor in communicative language use. This kind of phenomenal appreciation of LCC, in which the phenomena are culturally-informed speech acts, has given rise to spirited sociopolitical debates since the early 1960s, when Basil Bernstein identified different *codes* of language use within British society and suggested that children of the lower working class needed to learn the middle-class code as a precondition for success in school. The subsequent debates in Britain and elsewhere have tended to center on the very question of acknowledging privileged language codes, which implies a view of other codes as deficient and may be seen as leading to cultural subjugation of their users. Now the controversy includes anxiety about the spread of English itself as a global language: an uneasy anticipation of cultural change felt not only outside the traditional English-speaking communities, but within them as well:

I think he felt that some part of the culture he had inherited by right as a native speaker of English was being alienated from him by the participation of others who hadn't inherited it by birth, or at least not through the mother tongue. (Pringle 1985:129)

Such is the strength, even in post-Whorfian times, of the sense that language, culture, and personal identity are inseparable.

5.3 Didactic LCC

The autumn 1997 *TESOL Quarterly* is a special-topic issue on Language and Identity in which the relationships considered are almost entirely between language pedagogy and sociopolitical conceptions of culture. The longest article (Duff & Uchida 1997) follows four teachers of EFL at a language school in Japan. One subject, codenamed Danny, is a young American who cajoles his adult students into adopting (or indulging) his deficit view of their cultural code:

Culture for him was not a spectrum of acceptable alternatives but rather a dichotomy of right or wrong moral choices. He sought to help students make “correct” choices by providing appropriate models.

(Duff & Uchida 1997:462)

The other three subjects in the Duff-Uchida study are troubled, variously, by a personal sense of alienation from mainstream American culture; by the responsibility of mediating clashes between colleagues from different cultural backgrounds; and by classroom difficulties arising from the heady influence of a team-teaching partner (Danny) with an ideological agenda. Throughout this special *TESOL Quarterly*, the focus is on culture as a discrete element in some combination: the freight that is carried by the vehicle of language pedagogy, or the value systems that bear on language teachers’ professional behavior. These may be called phenomenal appreciations of LCC wherein the phenomena are cultural precepts.

6 Analysis and discussion

It is time now to review the salient points of the appreciations noted in the preceding sections. Since it is not to be expected that any one of these separately-focused views alone will suffice for the purposes of language teachers or learners, an attempt will be made to bring some of their elements together in a coherent and purposeful view.

6.1 Schemata of appreciation

We have seen that the notion of a relationship between language and culture invites a variety of appreciations, each starting within a different context and proceeding toward a different ground for conclusion. To fix a context is to turn certain facets of language and culture toward our magnifying lens: *culture* as intellectual tradition, sociopolitical forces, or shared experience; *language* as record of experience, medium of communication, or rarefied abstraction. Moreover, it seems that when the narrow context is fixed, a certain form of broad understanding is foreshadowed. A study of either the theories alone or the articles alone may resolve itself into a particular picture of some controlling *logos* or schema: a philosophical consortium that denies meaning to us all, or a dominant language code that denies a voice to some (though it is recalled that in the 1980s television series *The Story of English* a British phonologist traced a pattern wherein working-class pronunciation features, at least, displace upper-class ones). The historical evidence tends to show language changing with human needs, as words continually acquire meaning from those who use them. This suggests that concerns about the culturally oppressive potential of English as a global language (essentially deterministic concerns) are at least questionable, since it seems that we human beings are capable of making our own imprint on the language we use.

More broadly, the various appreciations have sounded some chords of relativity: of language and culture symbiotically in flux, and of meaning in doubt.

6.2 Circularity and symbiosis

There is a unifying theme of circular, enfolding interaction: Fynsk's "receptive joining"; Fiumara's "more 'circular' way of thinking"; the continual reaffirmation of language patterns by repetition; the evolution of *conscience* in concept and syntax; the word that dies by taboo but rises to suck the lifeblood of others; the prospect that English and the world will change each other. This theme is central to the philosophy of Cassirer, who sees language and culture in

a state of original symbiosis (but who distills from the concept of culture the most primal element, and so refers to language and *myth*). Cassirer conceives of a dynamic relationship in which language and myth emerged together out of our ancestors' earliest epiphanies and have continued to reshape and replenish each other. Such a relationship implies not only organic circularity, but also the normality of doubt: if we believe that language is bound up with myth, not as its medium or its determiner, but as its double, we cannot be complacent in our logic or our *logos*. In verbal interaction, this recognition entails acceptance of a kind of doubt, arising from the almost infinite diversity of human experience, that may be called *relational uncertainty*.

6.3 Relational uncertainty

The literature of communicative language pedagogy has little to say on the dispiriting subject of relational uncertainty (perhaps nothing couched in exactly those words), but it once doomed a well-grounded intercultural encounter in Bulgaria. There, nodding the head means “no” and shaking it sideways means “yes”. Although Russian troops garrisoned in the country learned the local custom and took care to observe it, this communicative sophistication did no good. Their interlocutors-in-gesture could not, after all, be sure that a particular Russian was using Bulgarian body language, even if they knew that some Russians lately were doing so (Axtell 1991). The consequent rout of holistic communication probably became an orderly retreat to simple phrasebook communication (phrasebooks never omit “yes” or “no”), but it showed that a nod is not a sign without a receptive joining.

Signification in verbal intercourse may be compromised in the same way. It is not enough to recognize the prolific vitality of language and celebrate it. Since at any moment myriad linguistic subcultures coexist in different states, we must negotiate meaning at the level of semantics: “*literally* had a heart attack”; “able to understand *verbal* instructions”; “he wants to be, *like*, the president of Harvard”. Sometimes negotiation is prohibitively awkward or absolutely im-

possible. Though *gaily* goes well with *decorated*, one hesitates either to depend on its being taken as intended or to probe the possibility that it will not be. We find it difficult even within our own speech community to calculate what our hearers know, what they think we know and intend, how much they care, and so on. No matter what choice we make, the cultural environment interferes: by denying us the use of a word, or by denying us a hearer with the appropriate receptivity, or simply by denying us the certainty that our words have been interpreted correctly. Across borders, how are we to know what *privacy*, *feminist*, *service*, or *sabotage* signifies? Nor can we be sure to what extent other people believe in the cultural icons and myths that crop out in the idiom of their language (see Veyne 1988 on the creation of truth).

It may even be that we are confused about our own beliefs, and unconscious of voids where reason should be, so that uncertainty sets in with the very notion of signification. This is suggested by the freewheeling cycle of usage, especially where quotable sources are involved.

6.4 The rule of logos

But to my mind, though I am native here and to the manner born, it is a custom more honour'd in the breach than the observance.

(Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I. Sc. IV.)

That one famous line gives us two chances to step from the sublime to the ridiculous. First, we may use the phrase *to the manner born* as Shakespeare did, but we cannot enter people's minds to testify that this is neither a blunder nor a pun on the inane but ubiquitous *to the manor born*. Perhaps we cannot even free ourselves from the suspicion that we did, after all, choose the phrase for its doubled effect. It seems that cultural experience has changed the idiom so that we can no longer be sure whether we have quoted the Bard or the Wag.

Second, we may betray a shameful capacity for assimilating pernicious nonsense if it has been established in usage.

A paradox confusedly worded has an immense appeal. It seems oracular,

cryptic, darkly wise. (Evans & Evans 1957:305)

When Hamlet says that the coarse wassailing custom is “more honour’d in the breach than the observance”, he means there is more honor in breaching such a custom than in observing it (Evans & Evans 1957). However, the phrase *to honor ... in the breach* has been fatuously transmitted, by the literate, as an urbane-sounding paradox that seems to excuse the omission of an obligation. In expressions like this and *the exception proves the rule* (see the Evanses especially) we can glimpse the real danger of linguistic decline: the ease with which we allow our minds to be ruled by the halved *logos*, especially when *logos* dictates what we wish to hear. The task of supplanting passive reception of language with the inquiring receptivity envisaged by Fiumara becomes increasingly difficult and increasingly vital as we find ourselves surrounded by the interlocking symbols of a synthetic culture.

While we are presented daily with the possibility of choice (as with products) or of casting a vote, we do not have the ‘opportunity’ (or ‘freedom’) to envisage and theorize the grid-like nature of the vast cultural output that constantly enshrouds us. (Fiumara 1990:112)

It is proposed that the pursuit of this elusive opportunity, in a spirit of unperturbed doubt, should be the aim of our new appreciation.

6.5 Toward a skeptical appreciation of LCC

The proposed appreciation of the relationship between language and culture, conceived for reference in language teaching and learning, is therefore called a *skeptical* one. It does not falsify the appreciations already noted, but attempts to collect their most concordant elements. Here, finally, are its characteristics:

1. It starts from the acceptance of relational uncertainty. It recognizes the variability of meaning between people and over time, and the error of presuming to signify or apprehend meaning with confidence.
2. It recognizes a “shroud of culture” that we must try to penetrate in order to understand ourselves and others, and not a “blood of culture” suffus-

ing our thoughts and words with manners of meaning to which we were born.

3. It waits for the intelligent gathering-in, sheltering, and enfolding of words to reveal what is humane in the meanings they imperfectly convey. It is a listening, reconciling state of mind.
4. It is a festive skepticism that delights in language and people, as they are.

7 Conclusion

The postulation of a relationship between culture and language led to the establishment of the general rubric “language-cum-culture” (LCC) and, under it, an examination of several “appreciations”, or ways of apprehending and treating such a relationship. In the process, suggestions from theory, from historical evidence, and from phenomena led to an attempt to conceive a beneficial new appreciation for language teaching and learning.

It was found that while there was nothing to be gained by reviving Whorfianism, there is much evidence of interplay between language and culture, as well as a lively awareness of it among language-teaching professionals. Two philosophers contributed views of language that emphasize the essentiality of relation and reception; another, the complementary notion of symbiosis between language and myth.

The study ended by proposing a skeptical appreciation characterized by the recognition of uncertainty, of an overarching cultural shroud to be penetrated, of intelligent receptivity as essential to language, and of the pageantry that rewards attention to language and culture.

References

- Axtell, R.1991. *Gestures: The Do's and Taboos of Body Language Around the World*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Barfield, O.1967. *History in English Words*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

- Bowers, R.1998. "Talking shop with David Crystal". *ELT Journal* 52/2:146-153.
- Carruthers, P.1996. *Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cassirer, E.1946. *Language and Myth*. Trans. S. Langer. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Cassirer, E.1955. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1:Language*. Trans. R. Mannheim. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Duff, P. and Y. Uchida.1997. "The negotiation of teachers' sociocultural identities and practices in postsecondary EFL classrooms". *TESOL Quarterly* 31/3:451-486.
- Evans, B. and C. Evans.1957. *A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage*. New York: Random House.
- Fiumara, G.1990. *The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening*. Trans. C. Lambert. London: Routledge.
- Fodor, J.1975. *The Language of Thought*. New York: Crowell.
- Fodor, J.1987. *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Fynsk, C.1996. *Language and Relation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hoijer, H.1954. *Language in Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jackendoff, R.1983. *Semantics and Cognition*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Jackendoff, R.1992. *Languages of the Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Katz, J.1972. *Semantic Theory*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson.1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. and Z. Kovecses. 1987. "The cognitive model of anger inherent in American English". In D. Holland and N. Quinn (eds.). *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lehmann, W.1973. *Historical Linguistics: An Introduction*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Meier, A.1997. "Teaching the universals of politeness". *ELT Journal* 52/1:21-28.
- Pinker, S.1994. *The Language Instinct*. London: Penguin.
- Pringle, I.1985."English language, English culture, English teaching". In S. Tchudi (ed.). *Language, Schooling and Society* 119-131. Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Boynton Cook.
- Sampson, G.1980. *Schools of Linguistics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Sapir, E.1949. "Culture and personality". In D. Mandelbaum (ed.). *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture and Personality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sinclair, J.1987. "Collocation: a progress report". In R. Steele and T. Treadgold (eds.). *Essays in Honour of Michael Halliday*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Stern, H.1983. *Fundamental Concepts of Language Teaching*. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Whorf, B.1956. "The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language". In J. Carroll (ed.). *Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Veyne, P.1988. *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*. Trans. Paula Wissing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zapata, G.1998. "Proverb project". *TESOL Journal* 7/4:38-3.